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Emmie West
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This article summarizes most of the United States
Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions of the last
term.
CONFESSIONS: MIRANDA
The most publicized criminal procedure decision of the
term was Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000),
which offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to overrule
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Two years after
Miranda was decided, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501,
which provides for the admissibility of a confession as long
as the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the
confession was voluntary. Unlike Miranda, § 3501 does
not require that the suspect be warned of the right against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel.
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, held that
"Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may
not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that
Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both
state and federal courts." 120 S.Ct. at 2329-30.
In holding that Miranda was a constitutional decision, the
Court relied on: (1) the fact that Miranda had been applied
to proceedings in state courts, a domain in which the
Supreme Court's authority is limited to enforcing the
Constitution, (2) the text of the Miranda opinion, which commences with the statement that certiorari was granted "to
give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement
agencies and courts to follow," 384 U.S. at 441-42, and goes
on to include other references to the Court's belief that it
was adopting a constitutional rule, and (3) the Miranda
Court's encouragement of legislative action to protect the
right against self-incrimination, as long as such action was
"at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it." ld. at 467.
The court of appeals, in its decision overruling Miranda
and upholding § 3501, relied on cases in which the
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Supreme Court had recognized exceptions to Miranda. The
Court agreed that it had made exceptions, but that these
cases stood only for the principle that "no constitutional rule
is immutable." 120 S.Ct. at 2335. An alternative argument in
favor of the court of appeals' decision was made by the amicus curiae, who stated that § 3501 is as effective as
Miranda. The Court did not agree, since "§ 3501 explicitly
eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation warnings in
favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such
warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness
of a suspect's confession:· ld. The Miranda Court imposed
specific warnings because it believed the traditional totalityof-the circumstances test involved too much of a risk that an
involuntary statement would be admitted into evidence.
Since the test in § 3501 required only the totality of. the circumstances, without the specific warnings from Miranda,
the Court held that "[s]ection 3501 therefore cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law." ld. at 2336.
The Court stated that it would not overrule Miranda,
based on the prinCiple of stare decisis. In order for the
Court to depart from precedent, there must be a "special
justification." ld. (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
842 (1991)). The Court found no such justification for overruling Miranda, which "has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture." ld.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Flight as Justification for a Terry Stop
In Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000), the defendant
fled upon seeing police officers patrolling in an area known
for narcotics trafficking. Two officers caught Wardlow and
conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons.
Discovering a .38-caliber handgun, the officers arrested the
defendant. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, upheld the
stop.
Police have a right to stop and question individuals, and
individuals have a right to not respond. "And any 'refusal to
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position." ld. at 1379.
Justice Kennedy, writing a concurrence in which the
Chief Justice joined, distinguished different types of anonymous tips: "If the telephone call is truly anon¥mous, the informant has not placed his credibility at risk and can lie with
impunity. The reviewing court cannot judge the credibility of
the informant and the risk of fabrication becomes unacceptable." ld. at 1381. In contrast, an informant who places his
anonymity at risk, by approaching an officer in person or by
calling a police station with caller identification, for instance,
should be treated differently.

cooperate, Without more, does not furnish the minimal level
of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.'
But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not 'going about one's business'; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate
further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go
about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the
face of police questioning." ld. at 676 (quoting Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S.429, 437 (1991)(citation omitted)).

In order for a police officer to conduct a Terry stop,
the officer needs reasonable suspicion. An "inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch"' does not
rise to the level necessary to constitute a reasonable
suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968}. Ho\AJever,
officers are allowed to consider all relevant factors, including the characteristics of the surroundings and the
individual's behavior. The Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, ruled that the defendant's unprovoked flight upon seeing the officer and his presence in
a high crime area are relevant and constitute a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot." 120 S.Ct. at 675. As the Court put it: "Headlong
flight -wherever it occurs - is the consummate act of
evasion: it is -not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,
but it is certainly suggestive of such." ld. at 676. The
Court, however, did not adopt a per se rule under which
flight always justified a stop.

Manipulation of Baggage
The Supreme Court in Bond v. United States, 120 S.Ct.
1462 (2000), addressed the issue of whether a Border
Patrol Agent's tactile inspection of the outer surface of a
carry-on bag constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that it
did.
Bond was a passenger on a bus that stopped in Texas for
a border patrol check. The agent boarded the bus and verified the citizenship of the passengers. As the agent left the
bus, he ran his hand along the luggage stored in the overhead bins, squeezing each bag. The agent felt something
"brick-like" in Bond's bag. Bond admitted the bag belonged
to him and gave the agent permission to open it. Upon inspection, the agent discovered a brick of methamphetamine.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court, holding that the agent's "manipulation of the bag was
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. Bond, 167 F.3d 225, 227 (5th Cir.1999).
The Supreme Court reversed, in a decision written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist.
·
The Fourth Amendment grants the "right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures ...." The Court
held that "[a] traveler's personal luggage is clearly an 'effect'
protected by the Amendment." 120 S.Ct. at 1464. In analyzing whether the manipulation of the luggage was a search,
the Court looked at two elements: (1) "whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual expectation of
privacy" and (2) "whether the individual's expectation of privacy is 'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."' ld. at 1465 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
740 (1979)). As to the first element, the Court found that
Bond had exhibited an expectation of privacy by putting his
belongings in a bag and placing the bag above his seat. As
to the second element, the Court found that although it is
reasonable for a traveler to expect his or her bag to be handled, it is not reasonable to expect that others will "feel the
bag in an exploratory manner." ld. Because the two elements were satisfied, the Court held that the agent's manipulation of the bag violated the Fourth Amendment.

Terry Stops: Anonymous Tips
The issue in Florida v. J.L., 120 S.Ct. 1375 (2000), was
whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun
is, without more, sufficient to justify a stop and frisk. An
anonymous caller reported that a young black male standing a:t a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was
carrying a gun. The call was not recorded, nothing was
known about the informant, and the informant did not give
any other information to show whether he had any familiarity
with the suspect's affairs or future movements. The police
responded to the report, arriving at the scene within six minutes. There were three black males at the bus stop, and
one was wearing a plaid shirt. The officers did not see a
firearm, and the males did not act in any unusual way upon
seeing the approaching officers. One officer frisked the
male wearing the plaid shirt (J.L.) and found a firearm. The
second officer frisked the other two men and found nothing.
The Court ruled, in a unanimous vote, that the frisk was
unconstitutional. The Court noted that the "reasonableness
of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers
knew before they conducted their search. All the police had
to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew
about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had
inside information about J. L." Id. at 1379. The Court also
stated that an "anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability ...
does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm." ld. at 1380.
In so ruling, the Court rejected a "firearms exception,"
under which a lower standard of suspicion would suffice: "A
second major argument advanced by Florida and the United
States as amicus is, in essence, that the standard Terry
analysis should be modified to license a 'firearm exception.'
Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would
justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this

Crime Scene Exception
In Flippo v. West Virginia, 120 S.Ct. 7 (1999), the defendant was vacationing with his wife at a state park, when he
called 911 to report an attack on himself and his wife. The
officers who responded to the call found petitioner with injuries to his head and legs and his wife inside the cabin with
fatal head wounds. The officers questioned the defendant
and took him to a hospital. They closed off the area and
later searched the cabin for 16 hours. When they found a
briefcase inside the cabin, they opened it and seized the
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contents, which included evidence.
The defendant was indicted for the murder of his wife and
moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the closed
briefcase. The police had not obtained a warrant. His motion to suppress the evidence was denied. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that there is no general "crime
scene exception" to the warrant requirement, citing Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), which had rejected any
general murder scene exception. The Court remanded, noting that its decision was limited to this one issue and that it
was not commenting on any other possible theories that
might satisfy the Fourth Amendment.

that Hubbell's testimony was "compelled" as described in
Doe. In comparing Hubbell's case to Fisher, the Court
found that in Fisher the Government already knew the documents existed and were with the taxpayer's attorneys,
whereas in Hubbell's case, the Government had no prior
knowledge of the documents Hubbell produced.
Immunity
The Court held that the Fifth Amendment extended not
only to incriminating evidence but also to information that
can lead to the discovery of incriminating evidence. The
Court held that "respondent's act of producing subpoenaed
documents was the first step in a chain of evidence that led
to this prosecution." 120 S.Ct. at 2046. In Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), the Court had held that a person with immunity does not have to prove that his or her testimony was used improperly. Instead, the burden is on the
prosecution "to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is
derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony." ld. at 460. In this case, the
Government could not do so; in fact the Government admitted it only learned of the crimes because of the documents
produced by Hubbell.
The Government argued that it was not going to use the
documents at trial, but the Court stated that the question
was not whether the Government would use the documents
later, but whether "it has already made 'derivative use' of the
testimonial aspect of that act [of production] in obtaining the
indictment against respondent and in preparing its case for
trial. It clearly has:' 120 S.Ct. at 2046.
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion, joined by
Justice Scalia. Justice Thomas stated that only allowing the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination fortestimonial evidence may be inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. He argued that "witness"
was broadly defined at common law to mean "one who
gives evidence." ld. at 2053. Justice Thomas stated, "In a
future case, I would be willing to reconsider the scope and
meaning of the Self-Incrimination Clause." ld. at 2050.

FIFTH AMENDMENT: iMMUNITY
The first issue addressed by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Hubbell, 120 S.Ct. 2037 (2000), was
whether the defendant's disclosure of the existence of documents was protected by the privilege against self-incrimina. tion. The second issue was whether the government could
prepare criminal charges against the defendant based on
the contents of documents produced after a grant of immunity. The Court, in an 8-1 decision, found for the defendant
on both issues.
As part of a plea bargain, Hubbell pled guilty to mail fraud
and tax evasion and agreed to provide the Independent
Counsel with information relqting to the ongoing Whitewater
investigation. In an attempt to discover whether Hubbell
was indeed providing the promised information, the
Independent Counsel served him with a subpoena duces
tecum, asking for the production of documents before a
grand jury in Little Rock, Arkansas. Hubbell appeared and
invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; he refused to state whether he had any documents
responsive to the subpoena. The prosecutor produced an
order directing Hubbell to answer and granting him immunity. Hubbell then produced 13~ 20 pages of documents, answering that those were all of the responsive documents,
except for a few protected by the attorney-client and workproduct privileges. The contents of the documents led the
Independent Counsel to bring criminal charges against
Hubbell for tax-related crimes as well as mail and wire
fraud.

COMMENT ON DEFENDANT'S PRESENCE
In Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S.Ct. 1119 (2000), the prosecutor, in her summation, called the jury's attention to the fact
that the defendant had the opportunity to hear all other witnesses testify and to tailor his testimony accordingly. The
defendant argued that these comments burdened his Sixth
Amendment right to be present at trial and to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, as well as his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights to testify on his own behalf.
The Court, in an opinion· by Justice Scalia, rejected these
arguments. The Court refused to extend the rule in Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Griffin involved comments
upon a defendant's refusal to testify. The trial court instructed the jury that it was free to consider the defendant's failure
to deny or explain facts within his knowledge. The Supreme
Court held that such a comment, by "solemnizing the silence of the accused into evidence against him," unconstitutionally "cuts down on the privilege [against self-incrimination] by making its assertion costly." ld. at 614. Griffin was
thus based on the Fifth Amendment. "The prosecutor's
comments in this case, by contrast, concerned respondent's
credibility as a witness, and were therefore in accord with
our longstanding rule that when a defendant takes the
stand, 'his credibility may be impeached and his testimony
assailed like that of any other witness."' 120 S.Ct. At 1125

"Act of Production" Rule
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that the
protection of the Fifth Amendment is limited to "testimonial"
evidence. The Court explained that criminal suspects can
be compelled to engage in conduct that might be incriminating, such as providing blood samples or handwriting exemplars, but could not be compelled to communicate incriminating facts or beliefs. The Court held that Hubbell's production of documents was testimonial in nature.
In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court
had held that incriminating documents must be produced if
their creation was not "compelled." In Fisher, the documents
in question were working papers used by an accountant in
preparing an income tax return. These documents were
voluntarily prepared, so they were not "compelled."
However, the Court has recognized that the act of producing
documents can sometimes have a testimonial effect. For
example, in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the
mere turning over of documents to the grand jury was a protected testimonial communication, since production was an
admission of the witness's control of the documents, the
documents' existence, and their authenticity. The Court held
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finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant "acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or
group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000).
After plea bargaining, Apprendi pled guilty to two counts
of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful
· purpose and one count of third-degree unlawful possession
of an antipersonnel bomb. Each second-degree offense
was punishable by 5 to 10 years. The plea agreement gave
the State the right to request an enhanced sentence for the
shooting at the African-American family's home, based on
the hate crime statute. Under the statute, if Apprendi was
found guilty of a hate crime, he could face 10 to 20 years for
the second-degree offense instead of 5 to 10 years. The
plea agreement also gave Apprendi the right to challenge
any hate crime sentence.
The State filed a motion for an extended sentence, and
the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Apprendi's actions violated the hate crime statute. Apprendi
was sentenced to 12 years for the count relating to the
shooting, despite the maximum penalty of 10 years.
Apprendi appealed, arguing that the Due Process Clause
required a jury niust find him guilty of a hate crime beyond a
reasonable doubt in order for him to be punished in accordance with the statute.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the trial
court did err: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63.
The Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process, "[t]aken together ... indisputably entitle a criminal
defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a
reasonable doubt."' ld. at 2355-56 (quoting United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995)). After discussing the development of trial by jury in the criminal law setting, the
Court stated:
The historic link between verdict and judgment
and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to
operate within the limits of the legal penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme that
removes the jury from the determination of a fact
that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a
penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury
verdict alone. ld. at 2359.
The Court also pointed out that the requirement of "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt;' as established by In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), was based in part on
the fact that criminal defendants face a loss of liberty and
stigmatization if convicted. By increasing the maximum
sentence, the loss of liberty and amount of stigma are likewise increased; therefore, the Court reasoned that the "defendant should not ... be deprived of protections that have,
until that point, unquestionably attached." 120 S.Ct. at 2359.
The Court cited several of its previous decisions. It referred to Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), which
applied the same rule -that increases in maximum sentences based on any fact other than a prior conviction must
be made by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable
doubt- to a federal statute. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,

(quotingBrown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)).
See also Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989)("When [a
defendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that
generally apply to other witnesses - rules that serve ~he
truth-seeking function of the trial - are generally applicable
to him as well."); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235-36
(1980) (A defendant who takes the stand is "subject to
cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like any
other witness.") (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353
U.S. 391,420 (1957)); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S.
301' 305 (1895).
PRIOR CONVICTIONS: "DRAWING THE STING"
The defendant in Ohler v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 1851
(2000), was charged with drug. offenses. She had a previous felony conviction for methamphetamine possession.
The Government filed motions in limine for admission of
Ohler's prior conviction as impeachment evidence under
Federal Evidence Rule 609(a)(1 ). The district court subsequently ruled that the prior conviction would be admissible if
Ohler testified.
Ohler did testify, and during her testimony she admitted
to the prior conviction. She was found guilty. Ohler appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the prior
conviction to be used as impeachment evidence. The court
of appeals affirmed, holding that Ohler waived her objection
since she introduced the evidence in direct examination. In
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court first
cited the general waiver rule that "a party introducing evidence cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted." ld. at 1853.
Ohler contended that the waiver rule should not apply in
her situation. She argued that it would be unfair to force a
defendant to wait for the prosecution to introduce the prior
conviction, since the jury might think the defendant was trying to hide something. The Court questioned whether a defendant's credibility would really be threatened in this situation. The Court went on to say that even if the jury did find
the defendant more credible for introducing the evidence
during direct examination, that credibility would be unwarranted because the jury would not know that the only reason the defendant .introduced the prior conviction was because he or she failed to have it excluded.
Ohler also argued that her right to testify was unconstitutionally burdened. The Court stated that there was no such
burden: "[T]he rule in question does not prevent Ohler from
taking the stand and presenting any admissible testimony
which she chooses." ld. at 1855. Accordingly, "a defendant
who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction
on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was in error." ld.
Because this decision is not constitutionally based, it
does not automatically apply in state court.
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES: JURY TRIAL
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), the accused shot into the house of an African-American family.
He admitted to the shooting and stated that he had fired the
shots because he did not want the family in the neighborhood (he later retracted the statement). Apprendi was indicted on 23 counts, including four different shootings and
unlawful possession of weapons.
New Jersey has a hate crime statute, which allows the
trial judge to extend the term of imprisonment if the judge
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477 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court allowed for "sentencing factors" to be determined by a judge. However, the. McMillan
Court held that states could not use sentencing factors to
alter maximum sentences or to create separate offenses
with separate penalties. ld. at 87-88. In concluding, the
Court stated, 'The New Jersey procedure challenged in this
case is an unacceptable departure from the jury tradition
that is an indispensable part of our criminal justice system."
120 S.Ct. at 2366.
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion Uoined in part by
Justice Scalia), engaged in a historical analysis of what is
meant by a "crime" and concluded that the majority's rule is
not broad enough. He argued that a '"crime' includes every
fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment," id. at 2368, including the fact of prior conviction.

fendant pled guilty pursuant to a California rule permitting a
defendant both to deny committing a crime and to admit that
there was sufficient evidence for conviction. State law demanded the filing of a notice of appeal within 60 days of
conviction. The defendant was in lock-up for the first 90
days after sentencing, and his appointed public defender did
not file the notice of appeal. When the defendant tried to file
a notice of appeal after about four months, it was rejected
as untimely. The defendant then alleged ineffective assistance of counsel based on his appointed public defender's
failure to file a notice of appeal on his behalf after promising
to do so. The Ninth Circuit adopted a per se rule of ineffectiveness for failure to file a notice of appeal unless the accused specifically instructs counsel not to do so.
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the per se rule as
inconsistent with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Instead, the Court held that "counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an
appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this
particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel
that he was interested in appealing. In making this determination, courts must take into account all the information
counsel knew or should have known." 120 S.Ct. at 1036.
The Court also observed: "If counsel has consulted with the
defendant, the question of deficient performance is easily
answered: Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant's express
instructions with respect to an appeal. If counsel has not
consulted with the defendant, the court must in turn ask a
second, and subsidiary, question: Qvhether counsel's failure
to consult with the defendant itself constitutes deficient performance." Id. at 1035 (citation omitted}.
Further, to demonstrate prejudice the defendant must
show that counsel's deficient performance actually caused
his harm. "Accordingly, we hold that, to show prejudice in
these circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would
have timely appealed." ld. at 1038. Because of the record,
the Court remanded: "Based on the record before us, we
are unable to determine whether Ms. Kops had a duty to
consult with respondent (either because there were potential grounds for appeal or because respondent expressed interest in appealing), whether she satisfied her obligations,
and, if she did not, whether respondent was prejudiced
thereby." Id. at 1040.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Self-Representation on Appeal
In Martinez v. California Court of Appeal, 120 S.Ct. 684
· (2000), the defendant was a paralegal charged with converting a client's money to his own use. He represented himself
at trial and was acquitted of grand theft but convicted of embezzlement. Martinez filed a notice of appeal, along with a
motion to represent himself. The California Court of Appeal
denied the motion, and the California Supreme Court denied Martinez' application for a writ of mandate.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
California Supreme Court, holding that requiring Martinez to
be represented by a state-appointed attorney did not deprive Martinez of any constitutional right. In Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the Court held that there is
a constitutional right to go to trial without counsel. The
Court determined that the holding in Faretta was limited to
trial and did not extend to appeal.
The Court analyzed the rationale of Faretta and determined that, although some of the reasoning applied to appeals, there were distinctions. The Faretta Court relied on
the fact that the right to self-representation had been recognized throughout history. However, the reason for the right
was originally because there were few competent lawyers,
and this reasoning does not have the same force today.
Also, appeals were not widely recognized in colonial United
States, and there was no criminal appeal in England until
1907. The Faretta Court's reliance on the Sixth Amendment
does not apply, since the Sixth Amendment only deals with
trial.
The Faretta Court also relied on individual autonomy as a
reason for self-representation. The Court agreed that individual autonomy was equally relevant to trial and appellate
procedure. However, the Court stated that courts must balance the defendant's autonomy with the integrity and efficiency of the legal system: "Considering the change in position from defendant to appellant, the autonomy interests that
survive a felony conviction are less compelling than those
motivating the decision in Faretta. Yet the overriding state
interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice remains as strong as at the trial level." Martinez v. California
Court of Appeal 120 S.Ct. 684, 692 {2000). In addition, the
Court called its holding "narrow," as the states can modify
their constitutions to include a right to self-representation on
appeal.

Ineffective Assistance: Anders Briefs
In Smith v. Robbins, 120 S.Ct. 746 (2000}, the respondent was convicted in state court of second-degree murder
and grand theft of an automobile. His appointed counsel
believed that an appeal would be frivolous. The counsel followed the requirements set forth in People v. Wende, 25
Cal.3d 436, 600 P.2d 1071 (1979), by filing a brief summarizing the procedural and factual history of the case, with citations to the record. The defendant also availed himself to
his right under Wende to file a pro se supplemental brief.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
defendant had been denied effective assistance of counsel.
The California procedure set forth in Wende did not require
counsel to disc1,1ss the merits of the case or state that, upon
review, he has concluded an appeal would be frivolous.
Instead, counsel submitting a Wende brief offers to brief any

Ineffective Assistance: Consultation on Appeals
In Roe v. Flares-Ortega, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (2000), the de5

issues directed by the court. In contrast, Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967}, requires appellate counsel
to raise issues in an appellate brief when seeking to withdraw from representation because he believes that the appeal would be frivolous.
The Court noted that the states are permitted to devise
their own procedures, so long as those procedures are within the confines of the Constitution. States will not be forced
to use a single solution in dealing with difficult problems of
policy: "[T]he Anders procedure is merely one method of
satisfying the requirements of the Constitution for indigent
criminal appeals. States. may- and, we are confident, will
-craft procedures that, in terms of policy, are superior to,
or atleast as good as, that in Anders. The Constitution
erects no barrier to their doing so." 120 S.Ct. at 759. The
Wende procedure "affords adequate and effective appellate
review for criminal indigents. Thus, there was no constitutional violation in this case simply because the Wende procedure was used." ld. at 763.
The Court next discussed some of the weaknesses of
the Anders rule as well as some advantages of the Wende
rule. For example, Wende "requires both counsel and the
court to find the appeal to be lacking in arguable issues,
which is to say, frivolous." ld. at 761. Also, under Wende
counsel does not seek to withdraw but is available to brief
issues that the appellate court finds meritorious.

trial judge imposed the death sentence. The Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence.
Williams filed a petition for habeas corpus with the state
court. The Circuit Court found that the trial was valid but
that Williams's counsel was ineffective at the sentencing
hearing. Based on its finding, the Circuit Court recommended a rehearing on the sentencing phase. The Virginia
Supreme Court reversed. Even assuming Williams' counsel
was ineffective, the Virginia Supreme Court determined that
the omitted evidence would not have affected the sentence
and that Williams had not demonstrated the hearing was
unfair.
Williams then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus.
The federal trial court reversed, affirming the decision of the
state Circuit Court. But the federal court of appeals reversed, construing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), as requiring a grant of habeas relief
only if the state court "'decided the question by interpreting
or applying the relevant precedent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is unreasonable."' 163 F.3d 860,
865 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Green v. French, 143 F. 3d 865,
870 (4th Cir. 1998)). Since the court of appeals found the
decision of the state trial court to be reasonable, it did not
grant Williams' petition.
In reversing, the Supreme Court first interpreted §
2254(d)(1) and then applied the statute to Williams' claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the court on the issue of statutory interpretation Uoined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy). The Court stated that the
1996 version of§ 2254(d)(1), which governs Williams' case,
changed the previous rule that federal courts owed state
courts no deference in habeas cases. Now, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a defendant must show that the
state's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28
U.S. C.§ 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed. Supp. Ill). The Court interpreted the "contrary to" clause to mean that a writ may be
granted "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the
state court decides a case differently than this Court has on
a set of materially indistinguishable facts." 120 S.Ct. at 1523.
The Court interpreted the "unreasonable application" clause
to mean that a writ may be granted "if the state court identi.ties the correct governing legal principle from this Court's
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts
of the prisoner's case." ld. The Court stated that the Fourth
Circuit erred in relying on the statement in Green v. French,
143 F. 3d 865 (4th Cir. 1988), that a petition for habeas corpus could only be granted if the state court applied federal
law "in a manner that.reasonable jurists would all agree is
unreasonable." 143 F.3d at 870. The Court explained that
this "standard would tend to mislead federal habeas courts
by focusing their attention on a subjective inquiry rather than
on an objective one." 120 S.Ct. at 1522.
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the court on the
issue of statutory application Uoined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer). The Court held
that the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court, rejecting
Williams' claim of ineffective counsel, was both "contrary to"
and an "unreasonable application" of established law. The
Court cited Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),
the current law for proving ineffective assistance of counsel:

Ineffective Assistance: Capital Sentencing
In Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000}, the defendant, while in custody on an unrelated offense, wrote a letter
confessing to killing a man. After questioning, Williams admitted he killed the man and took three dollars from his wallet. He was convicted of robbery and capital murder. At the
sentencing hearing, the prosecution offered evidence of
Williams' prior convictions for armed robbery, burglary, and
grand larceny. The prosecution entered Williams' confession
letter and described Williams' attack of an elderly woman
and his conviction for arson while awaiting trial. Expert witnesses for the prosecution testified that Williams posed a
continuing threat to society.
Williams' counsel offered character testimony by
Williams' mother and two neighbors (one of whom was
asked to testify while in the audience at the proceedings).
His couns"el also entered recorded testimony from a psychiatrist stating that Williams had removed bullets from his gun
in earlier robberies so that he would not hurt anyone. In
closing argument, Williams' counsel stated that it would be
difficult for the jury to justify sparing Williams' life. Counsel
did not investigate Williams' juvenile record because they
thought the law prohibited them from doing so. If they had
performed such an investigation, they would have discovered mitigating factors such as physical abuse and his parents' arrest for criminal neglect of their children. Williams'
counsel also failed to introduce evidence of Williams' borderline mental ret(;!rdation and sixth-grade education. In addition, counsel did not introduce evidence of Williams' good
behavior in prison, such as helping bust a drug ring and
turning in a guard's lost wallet, nor did they put on testimony
from prison officials who believed Williams was nonviolent.
An accountant who was respected by the community and
had visited Williams in prison as part of a ministry program
called Williams' counsel and offered to testify on Williams'
behalf. Counsel failed to return his call.
Based on the evidence at the sentencing hearing, the
jury unanimously fixed the punishment at death, and the
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would require reversal." ld. at 782 (citation omitted).

"First the defendant must show that counsel's performan~e was deficient....Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense ...."
ld. at 687. The Court stated that the Virginia Supreme
Court erred in holding that Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S.
364 (1993}, modified Strickland. The counsel in Lockhart
was deficient, but the counsel's ineffectiveness did not
prejudice the defendant. The Court stated that de~isions
such as Lockhart
do not justify a departure from a straightforward application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness of
counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive
or procedural right to which the law entitles him. In
the instant case, it is undisputed that Williams had a
right - indeed, a constitutionally protected right- to
provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that his
trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to
offer. 120 S.Ct. at 1513.

EX POST FACTO
Changes in Evidence Rules
In Carmel! v. Texas, 120 S.Ct. 1620 (2000), the
Supreme Court addressed a subject for the first time in
many years - the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause
to changes in evidence rules. Prior to September 1, 1993,
a Texas statute required one of three types of support for
testimony by victims in certain sex crimes prosecutions indecency with a child, sexual assault, and aggravated
sexual assault. The support for testimony included: (1)
corroboration by other evidence, (2} corroboration by
someone whom the witness informed within six months of
the offense (a type of "fresh complaint" rule), or (3) the
testimony alone, even without corroboration or fresh complaint, if the victim was younger than 14 at the time of the
offense. Effective September 1, 1993, the statute was
amended. The new statute included the same three requirements, but the age for the victim in the third requirement was changed to under 18.
Carmel! was convicted of 15 sexual offenses against his
stepdaughter. He appealed four of his convictions, which
involved conduct prior to September 1, 1993, during which
time the victim was older than 14. Carmel! argued that application of the new statute violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Under the old statute, the victim's testimony would
require corroboration. A Texas appellate court found
against Carmel!, ruling that the statute was procedural and
did not increase the punishment nor change the elements
of the offense.
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion delivered by
Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Breyer. The Court determined that the
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it "'alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender." ld.
at 1626 (quoting Calderv. Bull, 3 Dall.386, 390 (1798)).
Texas relied on Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 57 4
(1994), in which the retroactive application of a witness
competency provision was upheld as constitutional. Texas
argued the statute in Carmell's case was likewise a witness-competency rule that did not affect the definition of
the crime, its punishment, or the sufficiency of the evidence required to convict. The Court rejected this argument, ruling that the statute was not a mere witness-competency provision but was instead a sufficiency-of-the-evidence rule. The language in the Texas statute stated that
''[a] conviction ... is supportable on," whereas the language
in Hopt referred to "determining the competency of witnesses."110 U.S. at 587-88. Consequently, the Texas
statute did not "simply enlarge the class of persons who
may be competent to testify," nor did it "only remove existing restrictions upon the competency of certain classes of
persons as witnesses." ld. at 589-90.
In reversing, the Supreme Court quoted from Joseph
Story's comments on the Ex Post Facto Clause:
If the laws in being do not punish an offender,
let him go unpunished; let the legislature, admonished of the defect of the laws, provide against the

JURY CHALLENGES
In United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 120 S.Ct. 774
(2000}, a potential juror indicated a bias for the prosecution. The trial judge erroneously refused to dismiss the
juror for cause, and the defendant then exercised a
peremptory challenge to remove that juror. The defendant
also exhausted all the remaining peremptory strikes. The
issue was whether Martinez-Salazar was denied any right
under Federal Criminal Rule 24.
The Court noted that peremptory challenges are not
guaranteed by the Constitution. 'We have long recognized
the role of the peremptory challenge in reinforcing a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. But we have long
recognized, as well, that such challenges are auxiliary; unlike the right to an impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, peremptory challenges are not of federal
constitutional dimension." ld. at 779 (citations omitted).
Consequently, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury is not violated by his use of a peremptory
challenge to remove a potential juror that should have
been removed for cause. So long as the jury that sits for
the trial is impartial, the defendant has been afforded his
Sixth Amendment right.
As for due process, the Court noted that a "hard choice
is not the same as no choice. Martinez-Salazar, together
with his codefendant, received and exercised 11 peremptory challenges (1 0 for the petit jury, one in selecting an alternate juror). That is all he is entitled to under the Rule."
ld. at 781. The Court further commented: "In choosing to
remove Gilbert rather than taking his chances on appeal,
Martinez-Salazar did not lose a peremptory challenge.
Rather, he used the challenge in line with a principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional
guarantee of trial by an impartial jury." ld. at 781-82.
The Court also noted the limitations on its holding: "It is
not asserted that the trial court deliberately misapplied the
law in order to force the defendants to use a peremptory
challenge to correct the court's error. Accordingly, no question is presented here whether such an error would warrant reversal. Nor did the District Court's ruling result in
the seating of any juror who should have been dismissed
for cause. As we have recognized, that circumstance
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com~ission of future crimes of the same sort The
escape of one delinquent can nev~r produces? much
harm to the community, as may anse from the Infraction of a rule, upon which the purity of public justice,
and the existence of civil liberty, essentially depend.
Commentaries on the Constitution§ 1338 at 211, n.2.

pate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures
are required for waiver; and whether the defendant's choice
must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the
right at stake." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733
{1993). Fundamental rights require the defendant's person- T
al involvement for an effective waiver. E.g., Johnson v.
1):
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465 {1938) (right to counsel);
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (right to plead not
guilty). For other rights, however, their attorneys may effectively waive the right. "Although there are basic rights that
the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and
publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer has
- and must have- full authority to manage the conduct of
the trial:' Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 {1988). In
such cases, the defendant is "deemed bound by the acts of
his lawyer-ag13ni and is considered to have 'notice of all
facts, notice of which cari be charged upon the attorney."'
Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962) (quoting
Smith v. Ayer, 101 U:S. 320, 326 {1880)).
Certain rights, including scheduling matters, may be
waived by the action of counsel alone. "[T]he lAD 'contemplate[s] a degree of party control that is consonant with the
background presumption of waivabiliiy."' ld. at 665-66.
Furthermore, the lAD is a scheduling arrangement and
therefore can be waived by counsel.

Extension of Intervals Between Parole Hearings
In Garner v. Jones, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (2000), the Court confronted a different ex post facto issue. The question before
the Court was whether the retroactive application of a
Georgia law permitting the extension of intervals between
parole considerations violated the Clause. In 1974 respondent began serving a life sentence for murder. He escaped
five years later and committed another murder.
Apprehended and convicted in 1982, he was sentenced to
a second life term. At the time of respondent's second conviction, the Parole Board was required to consider parole
after three years. In 1985, the rules were amended to require reconsideration every eight years. The board reinstated its earlier three-year rule and considered respondent for
parole in 1992 and 1995. He was denied both times. In
1995, the Board resumed scheduling parole reconsiderations at least every eight years, and so at respondent's 1995
review it set the next consideration for 2003. The Board's
policy permits inmates to show a change in their individual
circumstances, which could expedite reconsideration for parole.
On review, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: "The
states must have due flexibility in formulating parole procedures and addressing problems associated with confinement and release." ld. at 1368. 'The idea of discretion is
that it has the capacity, and the obligation, to change and
adapt based on experience:' ld. at 1369. 'The Board's stated policy is to provide for reconsideration at 8-year intervals
'when, in the Board's determination, it is not reasonable 'to
expect that parole would be granted during the intervening
years."' ld. at 1369-70 (citation omitted). Thus, the State's
new policy did not act to increase respondent's punishment
for the crime he committed prior to the enactment of the
new policy.

DEATH PENALTY
Jury Instructions
Weeks v. Angelone, 120 S.Ct. 727 (2000), raised the
issue whether the Constitution is violated when a trial judge
directs a capital jury's attention to a specific paragraph of a
constitutionally sufficient instruction in response to a question regarding the proper consideration of mitigating circumstances. The defendant was a passenger in a car, which he
had previously stolen, when a State Trooper stopped the car
after it sped by. The officer asked the driver and defendant
to step out of the car, at which time the defendant fired his
9-millimeter semiautomatic pistol six times, killing the officer.
The defendant was arrested the next morning, and at that
time he confessed to the crime. A jury trial ensued, and the
jury asked the judge two questions during its deliberations.
The judge answered the second question by instructing the
jury to reread the second paragraph of the jury instructions.
On review, the Court ruled: "Given that petitioner's jury
was adequately instructed, and given that the trial judge responded to the jury's question by directing its attention to
the precise paragraph of the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its inquiry, the question becomes
whether the Constitution requires anything more. We hold
that it does not." ld. at 732-33. The Court went on to write:
"At best, petitioner has demonstrated only that there exists a
slight possibility that the jury considered itself precluded
from considering mitigating evidence. Such a demonstration is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation under
Boyde, which requires the showing of a reasonable likelihood that the jury felt so restrained." ld. at 734 (citing Boyde
v. California, 494 U.S. 370 {1990)).

INTERSTATE DETAINERS
The issue in New York v. Hill, 120 S.Ct. 659 {2000), was
whether defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article Ill of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (lAD) bars the defendant from
seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period. The lAD is a compact entered into by 48 States, the
United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for the resolution of one jurisdiction's outstanding
charges against a prisoner of another. If a defendant is not
brought to trial within the applicable 180-day period, the lAD
requires that the indictment be dismissed with prejudice.
Defendants may waive their most basic rights and constitutional protections. "Whether the defendant must partici-
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